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PERSONS AND THEIR LIVES 
REFORMATIONAL PHILOSOPHY ON MAN, ETHICS, AND BEYOND 
Gerrit Glas 
My view on what I see as the predicament of Christian philosophy in ethics has 
been shaped by a number of experiences. I will first share with you some of 
these experiences, to give you an impression of the background against which 
this article has been written. 
 
 
1.  Introductory personal remarks 
First, my take on philosophy has been influenced by experiences as psychia-
trist. In the course of years I have been intrigued by the formal similarities be-
tween certain kinds of philosophy and the practice of psychiatry and 
psychotherapy, in so far as both philosophy and psychiatry aim at restoring, or 
re-establishing, the connection between the person (the thinker, the patient) 
and some truth, or simply: ‘truth’. In the search for this truth, I learned to dis-
tance myself from the psychoanalytic model of ‘uncovering’ the truth, which is 
still indebted to an objectivistic epistemology.1 By learning to abandon this 
epistemology I gradually adopted a way of looking at people and their troubles 
that searches for an underlying fundamental dynamic behind the different lay-
ers of symptoms, syndromes, social and biographical context. This fundamen-
tal dynamic could be located in the interpersonal and, more fundamentally, in 
the intrapersonal sphere.  
 This dynamic has many dimensions, but is basically religious, I think. In 
clinical practice it seemed appropriate to phrase it in terms of a basic attitude 
or mood or theme or a set of such attitudes, moods, and/or themes. The cru-
cial change of view appeared to be to consider these attitudes (moods, themes) 
as being themselves the expression of some existential dynamic, and not as 
merely referring to such a dynamic as if these attitudes (moods, themes) were 
‘about’ or ‘toward’ a particular concrete event or state of affairs in the world 
(Glas 2001).2  
 
  
1   ‘Objectivism’ refers here to the psychoanalytic notion that truth consists of the latent, 
hidden content beneath the surface of consciousness and of everyday life. This content should 
be laid bare by ‘analysis’. I admit that this way of phrasing the case against psychoanalysis is 
one-sided. I am addressing what has been called Freud’s metapsychology, his theoretical ac-
count of the unconscious and of unconscious processes. Hermeneutical reinterpretations of 
psychoanalytic theory, however, focus much more on relational aspects of the analytic encoun-
ter and view truth more as emerging ‘within’ the analytic situation, that is, in the interaction 
between analyst and analysand.  
2   In clinical practice, though, both aspects often go together: the prevalent mood or affec-
tive stance expresses a particular existential dynamic and may at the same time refer to certain 
events, imagined or real.  
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 An example: anxiety related to loss of important others may refer to a fear of be-
ing abandoned by a certain person; however, taken as an existential attitude, 
anxiety related to loss of others is itself already the manifestation of such loss. It 
expresses, by its very existence, the unconnectedness and isolation of the person 
in question.3 The unconnectedness of people with respect to this form of anxi-
ety pervades their entire existence. They cannot connect to other people, they 
cannot commit themselves to a certain purpose of life, and they even seem to be 
unable to take their own existence serious.  
It seemed to me, moreover, that these types of dynamic not only operate in pa-
tients, but in each of us, differently of course, but yet recognizable. Each of us 
has a life which centres on certain core ‘themes’, representing fundamental 
attitudes or sets of attitudes and concomitant moods. We all have our anxieties 
and doubts, our hopes and longings, our unrest and moments of happiness.  
 Reformational philosophy has been extremely helpful in making sense of 
this dynamic in a philosophical way. It has always struck me, to what extent ‘re-
establishment of contact’ was at the very heart of Dooyeweerd’s endeavour, and 
how intrinsically this endeavour was connected with the uncovering of the re-
ligious dynamic in the perennial philosophical debate. More specifically, this 
dynamic has been laid bare in his theory of the process of opening-up of law 
spheres and of intermodal subject-object relationships. This theory has been 
extremely helpful to gain a sense of the interwovenness of structural unfolding 
and religious dynamism.4  
 The convergence between psychiatry and philosophy at such a crucial point 
has shaped my view of what I see as the predicament of Christian philosophy, 
also when it comes to ethics and morality in our time, namely: to restore con-
tact with what people value; to help them reconnect to the fundamental dy-
namic of their existence, by showing possible ways to open-up the closed and 
futile circles that encompass their lives — locking them in their private worlds.  
 
Second. This article has been written against the background of developments 
in the professional practices, especially medical practice (similar issues have 
been raised in business ethics and discussions on ethics and globalization). I 
will be brief, here, the issue is well-known, that is, a rising concern about the 
‘humanness’ of practices in the grip of the so-called technological and eco-
nomical imperative. New technical devices, increasing specialization, and pro-
tocollization of diagnostic and treatment procedures have contributed to the 
  
3   Of course, one could say that these basic attitudes (moods, themes) do not completely 
lack an ‘object’; their object is not ‘nothing’ or ‘nothingness’. The ‘object is rather existence 
itself, as a ‘whole’, in a more or less encompassing sense.  
4   Other thinkers have also been instrumental in re-interpreting philosophy as a way of re-
storing contact. I am thinking of Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, 
Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre – Søren Kierkegaard (1844, 1845, 1848) 
with his analysis of human freedom as entangled in itself and liberated by the ‘jump’ into faith; 
Heidegger (1927) with his analysis of anxiety as openness for the possibility of one’s (own) im-
possibility; Levinas (1974) with his notion of the Other as a disquieting openness or wound in 
my existence, Ricoeur (1990) with his four-fold analysis of the self as a relatedness to oneself 
opened-up by the presence of the other, Taylor (1989) with his notion of disengaged reason 
and of the intrinsic relation of persons to (their) ‘goods’, MacIntyre (1981) with his concept of 
‘goods’ internal to practices. 
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image of the professional as technician and administrator. Medical practice is 
increasingly dominated by external criteria like efficiency and (economic) 
profitability.  
 The attitude of the general public with respect to this development appears 
to be ambiguous. People, on the one hand, ask for diagnosis and treatment at 
the highest technical level; however, on the other hand, they also ask for tailor-
made advice, individualized treatment and personal concern on the side of 
medical personnel. The question then is how to combine professionalism at 
the highest technical level with humanness and wisdom.  
 Another, related issue is how high moral standards of doctors and nurses at 
a micro level (the individual patient and his or her family) should be weighed 
against moral standards at a macro level, especially the principles and values 
that govern the distribution of goods among the members of the society. Be-
neficence (micro level) and justice (macro level) are often competing values, 
especially when financial means are scarce. High tech does not solve this ten-
sion. On the contrary, it heightens it.  
 A third issue concerns the increasing importance of images and expecta-
tions with respect to medicine. One of the paradoxes of modern medicine, at 
least in the Western world, is that we feel increasingly unhealthy, whereas 
health statistics show an improvement of health and increased life expecta-
tions. Images and expectations highly contribute to the exaggeration of the 
role medicine can play in the provision of happiness and fulfilment.  
 In response to these demands Reformational philosophers have recognized 
the need for a new type of moral analysis. This type of analysis tries to avoid the 
pitfalls of both a deductive type of moral reasoning common in certain protes-
tant theological circles and the pragmatist utilitarianism of much contempo-
rary medical ethics by beginning with a structural analysis of the nature of the 
doctor — patient relationship.5 What would merit investigation before any-
thing else is whether morality is in some way intrinsic to the medical situation, 
the doctor — patient relationship. Other approaches, by emphasizing the in-
strumental role of medicine, treat medical practice as if it is neutral in itself 
and as if values and principles are to be added from without (by the patient, 
the doctor, or society) (see for similar interpretations: Taylor 1989; McIntyre 
1981). In response to this naturalist and instrumentalist approach Henk Jo-
chemsen, Jan Hoogland, and others, including myself, developed a model in 
which the doctor (nurse) - patient relationship is analyzed in terms of constitu-
tive and regulative norms and principles; with the constitutive side further ana-
lysed in terms of qualifying and conditioning norms, rules, and functions.6 This 
  
5   The traditional protestant theological approach, we had in mind, tried to derive moral 
guidelines for specific practical situations from general biblical principles and moral demands. 
This approach seemed to lack sensitivity for the specific nature of, for instance, the medical 
situation. The pragmatism of common medical ethics concerned for instance the well-known 
principalism of Beauchamp and Childress (1989, 2001) who in their approach tried to com-
bine the duty (rule) oriented view of the one and the utilitarian stance of the other author. 
This example is not meant to detract from the important role this book has played to put eth-
ics on the medical agenda.  
6   Jochemsen and Glas (1997), chapter 3. 
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analysis is a torso, I admit, and still needs further development in order to 
grant a more detailed and balanced view of the institutional and the consumer 
side of medical practice, the nature of nursing, and of issues related to the divi-
sion of labour and responsibilities in highly technical medical practices .  
 
Third. One of my concerns is the specific form of the issue of pluralism 
(moral, social) in which the possible contribution of Reformational philosophy 
seems to be cast. What I mean is that in a global world the work of Christian 
philosophers, and even more so of philosophers of the Dutch Neo-Calvinist 
brand, seems to be marginal and utterly local. There is, on the other hand, 
their conviction that they have something to offer and that, if not the concep-
tual analyses they provide, than at least the biblical worldview behind it has a 
claim to universality. However, two senses of the term ‘pluralism’ seem to 
blend here: the pluralism of the local and marginalized position of Christian 
thinking considered from a global (or: world) perspective; and the pluralism of 
the different moral and religious worldviews. These two senses of plurality 
need careful distinction. There is no need for Christian philosophers to give 
up their claims with respect to the universality of their moral and religious 
views when granting that their contributions at a global scale are marginal, or 
marginalized (both are true, I think).  
 This being said, however, it should be acknowledged that both senses of plu-
rality do not stand completely apart and that global plurality, or better: particu-
larity, affects the way Christian philosophers address their public — both 
academic and non-academic. This specific situation urges Christian thinkers, 
more than ever I think, to reflect on how to enter into the academic and cul-
tural discussion. What is needed particularly is the cultivation of a double sensi-
tivity, that is, sensitivity for the needs of the global world with its overwhelming 
differences between contexts on the one hand (this could be called: sensitivity 
for differences) and sensitivity for how to tune in to these needs on the other 
hand (relational sensitivity). Neo-Calvinist philosophy has something to gain 
with respect to this second aspect, I think. Christian philosophers have to be 
self-reflective and to be aware of the position from which they speak. They are 
themselves part of the plurality and fragmentation that threatens their and 
others’ access to spiritual sources. Therefore, they have to develop sensitivity 
for what is really essential and radical in the context in which they are speak-
ing. Their self-criticism helps them to be perceptive as to what supports and 
what hinders their message in the local context from which they are speaking. 
They need this perceptiveness in order to make contact with other thinkers in 
all their different contexts.  
 
 
2.  The predicament of Christian philosophy in ethics 
After this lengthy introduction, which in itself is an attempt to tune in to the 
situation in which we (I) find ourselves (myself ), I can be relatively short about 
what I see as the predicament of Christian philosophy in ethics, i.e.: to provide 
the conceptual tools to help people connect to the ‘good’ for their and others’ 
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lives. This may be accomplished when people learn to articulate their moral 
sensitivity while remaining true to its spiritual roots and with full awareness of 
the distinct responsibilities people have in different contexts. These very gen-
eral formulations leave several important questions unanswered, but they have 
the advantage of identifying the issue as one of connecting (instead of merely 
describing or analyzing), i.e. as a matter of exertion of receptive skills and on 
the focused and qualified nature of human responsibility.7 
 As I already suggested, the moral problem of today consists first of all of a 
lack of connectedness to sources of meaning (or value, or truth, or — even — 
reality). Meaning, value, truth and reality are concepts that usually are analyzed 
within the framework of systematic philosophy and metaphysics; partly also in 
philosophical anthropology. These concepts are bound to persons, in the sense 
that meaning, value, ‘the’ good and truth do matter for persons — and not for 
animals or inanimate objects. They are, moreover, bound to persons in such a 
way that the meaningfulness and truth of their lives depends on the manner 
and the extent of being connected to sources of meaning, truth, and the good. 
In other words, these concepts are both systematic and personal (or: existen-
tial). It is the task of philosophy to frame these terms in such a way that both 
aspects, the systematic and the personal, are related appropriately to the situa-
tion under discussion.  
 This may sound a little abstract. What I mean to say is that in the analysis of 
a particular moral situation, the philosopher tries to tune in to what is needed 
for the sake of the good in that situation (the ‘systematic’ aspect). While doing 
so, the philosopher is taking into account how people in that situation are re-
lated to ‘the’ good and also how the philosopher himself (herself) is related to 
the good — in order to understand whether and in which way this relatedness 
could enable others to restore their relationship to the good (the ‘personal’ 
aspect). I am referring here, in other words, to the double sensitivity men-
tioned earlier.  
 One example of this sensitivity would be the ability to recognize when in a 
certain moral debate a conceptual analysis of a certain state of affairs is appro-
priate and when a more ‘hermeneutic’, i.e. probing and questioning, type of 
attitude is called for. Another example would be to find the right way to com-
municate that while one’s own situation is to a certain extent similar to the 
situation of other parties, yet one’s attitude to that situation may well be fun-
damentally different from that of others. Christian philosophers have to show 
their solidarity with the problems of the world. These are their problems as 
well, irrespective of whether their solutions differ from those of secular think-
ers.  
  
7   The ‘unanswered questions’ refer to questions like: (a) how is philosophy as theoretical 
activity related to the practice of connecting? (b) is ethics about what is good or about what is 
right (cf. the contribution of John Hare in this volume)? and (c) is ethics concerned with all 
sorts of normativity, or only with a particular ‘ethical’ kind of normativity? and if so, (d) how to 
define this ethical normativity? I realize that in a full account of the position I defend, these 
questions have to be addressed. For now, I don’t want to bother too much about these more or 
less technical preliminary issues, because it would distract too much from the main thesis of 
this article.  
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 My focus on finding the right balance between existential and universal 
meaning (‘the’ good) is not meant to detract from the importance of descrip-
tive and purely analytical approaches to ethics. The reasons are obvious: these 
approaches help clarify concepts, they provide the conceptual tools to analyze 
complex situations, they may be instrumental for maintaining a balance be-
tween certain moral principles and/or normative aspects; their insights may 
also be used to structure the moral debate, for instance in (medical) ethical 
committees. However, even in (medical) ethical committees the most fruitful 
discussions arise when the issue of the good itself is tested intuitively and con-
ceptually. 
 At first sight it seems that Reformational philosophy has not been very sensi-
tive for this aspect of recognizing the importance of one’s relatedness to truth. 
However, this is only seemingly so. Dooyeweerd, for instance, has been very 
clear that he did not see philosophy as a straightforward theoretical expression 
of a certain life- and worldview; suggesting by this that there is a difference of 
‘stance’, or attitude, between pre-theoretical and theoretical understanding. 
Tempting as the idea of a comprehensive Christian approach (philosophy as 
expression of a life- and worldview) may be for a Christian philosopher, it 
would disregard the limitations of philosophy, limitations that are inherent to 
any theoretical thinking. It would unduly charge philosophy with claims inher-
ent in such a life- and worldview, claims like being ultimate and/or encompass-
ing. Aside, no philosopher has been more aware of the intricateness of this 
issue as Søren Kierkegaard (see especially Kierkegaard 1845). His play with 
pseudonyms is one sustained attempt to enter into the discussions of his time 
in the appropriate way and to save so both the personal — i.e.: the passion of 
faith — and the ultimate and universal character of Christendom.  
 Dooyeweerd’s sensitivity for the issue of ‘relatedness’ is a bit masked, I ad-
mit. But it is strongly present, albeit beneath the surface. Think for instance of 
his idea of ‘four horizons of truth’, each horizon having its own requirements 
as to the right position vis-à-vis the question of truth; think also of the emphasis 
on self-criticism and self-relatedness in his transcendental critique; and on the 
very notion of boundary itself. It has been said earlier by others, that bounda-
ries are no water-sheds. They can better be viewed as signposts, indicating dif-
ferences and transitions. Abraham Kuyper coined the term sphere sovereignty to 
indicate the irreducibility of responsibilities — and, thus, the irreducible dif-
ferences between attitudes/positions. Dooyeweerd expanded this sociological 
concept to a cosmological one, expressing the irreducibility of meaning aspects 
of reality. Transferred back again to the domain of human action, this cosmo-
logical principle of irreducibility gains a new dimension in the sense that the 
twin concepts of boundary/irreducibility now point to the distinctness of moral 
situations and corresponding responsibilities, while at the same time showing 
the inevitability of transitions between one ‘sphere of action’ (and characteris-
tic demeanour) to another.  
 So, the term ‘difference’ refers both to differences between positions and to 
differences between responsibilities associated with these positions and their 
characteristic demeanor. Positions are linked to specific features of the situa-
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tion or context. Differences can be made transparent with the language of 
modal aspects, but we need another language here too, a language that is 
geared toward a typology of practices and of distinct responsibilities of the par-
ties involved in these practices, together with an idea of the most appropriate 
way for philosophy to tune into and to analyze these practices. The term ‘tran-
sition’, then, refers to the unavoidable change of perspective when a person 
assumes another position (attitude; responsibility) and/or enters into another 
situation.  
 Philosophy itself, from this perspective, never gains the status of meta-
science, overarching all these practices; though it can address them all if it 
keeps well aware of the specific habitus and modest role of the philosopher. In 
short, the double sensitivity, mentioned previously, is an expression of a both 
Dooyeweerdian and Kierkegaardian recognition of distinctness of positions, 
responsibilities, and corresponding relationships to the good; and of the im-




3.  Ethics and Reformational Philosophy 
Contrary to what some might be inclined to say, there has already been done 
pretty much in the area of ethics and moral philosophy by Reformational phi-
losophers. Of course, a lot of work is still waiting, but when everything is taken 
into consideration the contribution of Reformational philosophers both to sys-
tematic-philosophical and to more applied issues has been substantial.  
I am thinking here of Dooyeweerd’s analysis of the ethical aspect and of inter-
modal subject-object relations, his work on the process of opening-up of law 
spheres, and the human body as an enkaptic structural whole; of Troost’s work 
on praxeology, dispositions, and the ethos; his insistence that no moral answer 
whatsoever has to be expected from ethics as a scientific discipline; of Richard 
Mouw’s contribution to ‘divine command ethics’ and his balancing of Calvinist 
and Anabaptist traditions. I also like to mention Puolimatka’s conceptual analy-
sis of the ‘meaning kernel’ of the ethical sphere (benevolence; Puolimatka 
1989); Al Wolters’s work on the notion of a creational order (Wolters 1995); Jim 
Olthuis’s on love (2001); the development of an ethics of compassion by Jim 
Olthuis, Brian Walsh and Hendrik Hart (Walsh et al 1995); Sander Griffioen’s 
(partly together with Richard Mouw) mapping of the differences between 
moral, contextual and associational pluralism, as well as his use of the metaphor 
of ‘finding a way’ (Mouw and Griffioen 1993; Griffioen 2003); the analysis of the 
moral nature of medical practice by Jochemsen, Glas, and Hoog-land (Jochem-
sen and Glas 1997); Schuurman’s work on ethics in a technological society 
(forthcoming); Stafleu’s on anthropology, as well as his contribution to an on-
tology of subject-object relationships (Stafleu 2002); the work of Sytse Strijbos 
on medical practice and systems philosophy (1988); and, last but not least, Bas 
  
8   In writing the last paragraphs and previous ones on double sensitivity in am indebted to 
Soren Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication, i.e., the idea that — in the current era 
— we do not have immediate access to truth (‘from face to face’) and that every understanding 
of truth is necessarily mediated by the person’s attitude to truth, which itself should be a mani-
festation of truth too.  
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Kee’s (and others) on business ethics. This list is not exhaustive and has been 
restricted to the work of those who feel they are in some way building forth on 
and/or substantially relating to the work of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven.  
Instead of now summarizing these contributions in a systematic way, relevant 
parts will be reviewed later on in our discussions , following the same approach 
as earlier in this essay. What I would like to do first, however, is to highlight 
three areas of possible concern, corresponding to what I consider to be three 
white spots in Reformational philosophical thinking, so far. 
 
1. Reformational philosophy does have only a rudimentary account of the in-
ner connection between religious directedness and the ‘embodiment’ of 
the ethical (‘the’ good) in character, attitudes, habits, and professional and 
institutionally anchored practices. Or, in the idiom of Reformational phi-
losophy: there is a gap between religious directedness in the ‘central’ sense 
and the moral practices in which this directedness takes on shape and ex-
pression. It is at this level that philosophical anthropology could play a use-
ful and important role (like political philosophy with its theory of institu-
tions in its account of communal goods).  
 
2. Reformational philosophers have shown a relative neglect of the issue of 
evil and of reconciliation. Dooyeweerd was very hesitant with respect to a 
philosophical investigation of evil and sin. “I for one do not venture to try 
and know anything concerning the problem that has been raised [the prob-
lem of whether sinful reality is still meaning; GG] except what God has 
vouched to reveal to us in His Word”, he says in the second volume of the 
New Critique.9 True and sincere as this statement may have sound seventy 
years ago, and for many still may sound, in a world in which the reality of 
evil erodes all public authority and is awkwardly present in every news bulle-
tin, it simply does not convince any longer. Christians can not afford to ab-
stain from philosophical reflection on the nature, the transmission and the 
battle against evil. Evil itself can settle down in innocence; its favourite path 
of transmission is — often — plain denial.  
 Certainly, very important work has been done in unmasking the deities of 
the present and the past ages. Dooyeweerd’s analysis and definition of apos-
tate groundmotives comes even very close to a definition of sin. His large 
historical reconstructions are a way to show how the peccatum originans of a 
certain way of thinking, in the end leads to unsolvable tension. Things go 
wrong when something ‘under the law’, the subjectum or subject-side of re-
ality, is absolutized. This absolutization is in fact a form of deification. 
When a culture deifies something ‘under the law’, the process of opening-
up will inevitably stagnate and will ultimately break down by internal an-
tagonism. It may take a while, but sooner or later the consequences of this 
‘absolutization’ are bound to lead to a clash of contrasting sub-motives and 
thus to internal disruption.  
  
9   H. Dooyeweerd, NC II, p. 33.  
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 Basically the same type of analysis could be performed with respect to 
persons and the way they exert their individual and group responsibilities. 
Analyzing the internal antagonism in people’s lives and in the dynamics of 
all sorts of groups can enormously profit from the conceptual framework of 
Dooyeweerd’s theory of opening-up of spheres of reality. 
 However, these types of analyses would still lack the right sensitivity to evil 
itself, especially its dynamics, its transmission, its seducing and even de-
monic qualities. In addition to the structural analyses sketched above, we, 
therefore, need a more intuitive, phenomenological, psychologically and theologi-
cally informed approach, an approach which is sensitive to evil’s non-
transparency and consequently to the ambiguity of any attempt to ‘under-
stand evil’. Such an approach would understand evil as human freedom en-
tangled in its own web; as a dynamic that restricts and paralyzes (instead of 
that it opens-up) and as something larger and ‘older’ than the persons who 
are involved.  
 
3. My third point is closely related to the previous one, but broadens the 
scope by suggesting that Reformational philosophy could greatly benefit 
from a re-opening of debates with theology. These debates have virtually 
been absent for a number of reasons, which I will not discuss here in extenso. 
It is well known, that Dooyeweerd’s caution was inspired by his fear for a 
scholastic type of rationalism — present also in the work of Abraham 
Kuyper — that could invade and damage the Christian life- and worldview. 
However, this attempt to safeguard the biblical life- and worldview against 
any theological input, could in the end lead to a kind of theological naiveté 
which made Reformational philosophy even more vulnerable to both un-
critical traditionalism and scientific criticism (by liberal theologians, for in-
stance). On my view, Christian intellectuals can no longer afford to ignore 
the results of biblical scholarship. Philosophers have an important role to 
play in scrutinizing these results with respect to their implications for the 
biblical life- and worldview. By doing so they may help the Christian com-
munity to appropriate these results. More specifically, Christian philoso-
phers need the help of theologians in their reflection on normative issues 
in the life sciences and the great cultural debates of our time.  
 
In the remainder of this article I will focus on the first two issues, ‘embodi-
ment’ and ‘evil’. In my treatment of these issues I will now and then make use 
of theological insight, in a provisional attempt to do justice to the third issue. 
 
 
4.  Embodiment or the possible contribution of philosophical anthropology 
In this section I will give an idea as to how the gap between central ‘directed-
ness’ and local moral practices might be bridged, as well as of the role philoso-
phical anthropological insights may have in this respect. I will first explore the 
notion of embodiment by surveying the salient features of an ethics of action 
(Embodiment [1]). Action is related to identity, identity is gained in the inter-
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action between structural unfolding and directedness at existential tasks; this  
interaction presupposes self-relatedness; and self-relatedness otherness. It will 
appear by then, that the ethics of action has to be supplemented by an ethics of 
receptivity. In an intermezzo I will, then, highlight these issues from the per-
spective of Paul Ricoeur’s work on the self (Embodiment [2]). After this in-
termezzo I will give a short review of what has been achieved in philosophical 
anthropology thus far — with a view to its relevance for ethics (Embodiment 
[3]). And then, finally, I close the section with a discussion of virtue ethics 
(Embodiment [4]).  
 
4.1  Embodiment — the preliminaries 
Let me start with the truism that the ‘the ethical’ should be seen as a qualifier 
(defining quality, indispensable feature) of human acting and behaving. In 
other words, the ethical is not a quality of a ‘what’, a thing or an event in the 
world; it is a feature of an act, more precisely of human acts. Acts refer primar-
ily to a ‘who’, that is, to a person performing acts. Moral theory, therefore, is 
related to notions of who one is, that is, to personal identity, and, further on in 
the chain of reflection, to social identity.10 A moral person is a person whose 
moral nature is exemplified by his or her character, by his or her being en-
dowed with particular qualities and dispositions (i.e., virtues), and, above all, 
by typical normative responses to morally demanding situations, responses 
which give testimony of the moral integrity of the person.  
 This may all seem self-evident, but it is nevertheless important to stress the 
bond between ‘the ethical’ and human action for several reasons. The first rea-
son is that the conceptual link between the ethical and human action can be 
used to raise reflection on ethics beyond the level of a modal (or: aspectual) 
approach. By tying the ethical to action, we are brought to a new conceptual 
and ontological realm in which the notion of agency gains relevance. Agency 
can not be reduced to ‘being a feature’ of a ‘substance’, nor can it be reduced 
to ‘being a cause’ (it would become a very special cause, then, a self-causing 
cause).11 The notion of agency opens a dimension of normativity right in the 
  
10   By saying this I do not imply that the physical world, plants and animals, in the way they 
function, lack any normative moment. Nor do I suggest that the ethical dimension is in some 
way ‘added’ to the world by the subject. One of Dooyeweerd’s great insights has been that the 
non-human world is receptive to normative qualities of human behaviour. This is expressed by 
the concept of object function. Inanimate objects, plants, and animals have an ethical object 
function, which means that their physical, biotic, and psychical functioning is receptive to and 
can be opened up by appropriate moral functioning of human persons. Knives can be used to 
kill and to heal. The knife is not just a knife, a merely physical object; it is in some cases a mur-
der weapon and in other cases a healing instrument. The ethical object function of the knife is 
indicated by its murdering and healing qualities — qualities that are not ‘added to’ the knife, 
from without so to say, but functional possibilities of the knife itself.  
11   I cannot go into the question whether substances can be such self-causing causes and 
consequently how agency could be conceived in a metaphysics of substances. Moreland and 
McRae (2000) argue for such an approach in their important work on anthropology and eth-
ics. I concur with their spirit (a defense of the notion of soul in a biblical sense), without shar-
ing their mind-body dualism and the metaphysics behind it. One could make a case, I think, of 
the statement that in their account the substantiveness of the body gradually disappears, in 
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middle of human existence, the dimension of responsibility. The other reason 
is that the conceptual link between the ethical and human action allows us, via 
the notion of personal identity, to attribute to normativity a certain degree of 
‘substantivity’. The ethical is not just a feature of human action, like other fea-
tures, it is embodied in actions, it solidifies in habits and practices and, by do-
ing so, pervades human existence. I admit that these formulations suffer from 
a certain vagueness, but I hope the thrust of what I am saying is clear enough.  
 It is tempting to continue at this point with a discussion of virtue ethics, its 
influence, of what it implies for the notion of embodiment — compared to Re-
formational philosophical insights on this score. But all this will have to wait till 
the last subsection (Embodiment 4), because — otherwise — a crucial concep-
tual knot in our discussion would be left undisentangled. So, let me first make 
a preliminary note on identity; and this on three related points. 
 The first point is that identity — via the notion of embodiment — is pre-
cisely the kind of concept we need in order to gain a better insight into the in-
terdependence of the temporal unfolding of the structural side of reality and 
the deeper existential and ultimately religious dynamics at work in this process 
of unfolding. It is by relating to oneself and others as well as to objects and 
events in the world that the subject (the child) acquires his or her identity.12 
The concept of embodiment refers to this same process of acquiring identity: it 
is by relating to others that the child learns to incorporate psychomotor pat-
terns (e.g., smiling; cooing and early forms of speech) and intentional actions 
(e.g., pointing at objects) and that it acquires inner stability with respect to 
regulation of basic needs and tolerance for the temporary separation from 
primary caregivers. All these processes contribute to one’s identity, which at 
the experiential level is reflected in the emergence of a basic sense of self, or 
core self. This identity is both attitudinal — we learn to take a stance with re-
spect to minor and major issues — and structural — we acquire more or less 
stable traits (character traits, for instance) and habits. Identity means that these 
attitudes and structural features become flesh and blood. They take on sub-
stance in a non-essentialist way, so to say. Identity is, therefore, not a possession 
(which one has and of which one is the owner), nor a mysterious (metaphysi-
cal) quality behind the empirical world. It is embodied in attitudes, traits, and 
habits, but also physically in gestures, mimic, body language and other physical 
characteristics. With this I do not suggest that there is nothing mysterious to 
identity; on the contrary, there will always remain something very enigmatic in 
  
spite of their body — soul dualism. Another issue is the distinctness between biblical and scien-
tific language. An important argument in almost all dualist accounts is the separation between 
body and ‘soul’ at death. I am not convinced that this ‘separation’ can be used as an argument 
for body-soul dualism as a philosophical position. Is what occurs at the moment of death not 
just as mysterious as what occurs at the moment of conception (and in God’s act of creation)? 
By introducing the biblical notion of the soul in a scientific discourse on mind-body dualism, 
one is coerced to adapt the biblical meaning of the concept to the prevailing ontology of sub-
stances and entities; and this almost always implies not only reduction (loss of meaning), but 
also adoption of certain conceptual characteristics inherent in the metaphysics of substances 
(such as separateness of substances; or self-sustenance; or being bearer of a bundle of fea-
tures).  
12   For a classic account see Daniel Stern (1985).  
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the singularity that is implied by the notion of identity, especially — but not 
only — with respect to human persons. What I am saying is that identity im-
plies embodiment and that embodiment presupposes the interplay between 
structurally anchored opportunities and a basic drive to gain orientation in the 
world.  
 The second point is closely related to this and in fact the other side of the 
same coin. It says that the embodiment of human beings, just sketched, can 
only fully be grasped from the perspective of self-relatedness. Self-relatedness, 
in other words, is the hinge, the conceptual link, between structural unfolding 
and fundamental (existential/religious) orientation. This self-relatedness exists 
even at very elementary levels of existence, as developmental psychology and 
neurobiology have made clear. Basic capacities like grasping, visually localizing 
the source of sounds, and distinguishing between me and you, develop as a re-
sult of ongoing multimodal processes of acting and experiencing, of changing 
one’s action a little bit and then experiencing how this feels or what it looks 
like. These visual, tactile, and kinaesthetic experiences are not only changes in 
the child’s relationship to a certain object, but also changes in the relationship 
of the child to itself. In short, doing something different, feels different.  
It is tempting to pursue this idea a bit further by extrapolating it to the bodily 
sphere and especially to the working of the brain. Could it be that self-related-
ness is even reflected in the biological substratum of mental functioning, in par-
ticular in neuronal structures, in the way they are wired and function? This is 
something to hold on to. It is certainly intriguing to see how many bodily func-
tions and structures are represented in the brain (suggesting self-relatedness) 
and how also one’s life history is ‘stored’ and represented and remembered, to 
an important extent by cues that are given by the memory of the body’s history 
(Damasio 1994; 1999). This link between episodic memory and the history of 
the body not only points at the importance of embodiment, but also at the im-
plicitness of self-relatedness. Long-term memory is not like a room in an enor-
mous building that could freely be opened (conscious remembrance) or closed 
(no memory). This metaphor obscures that not only conscious memories, but 
also implicit memories play an important role in the way we structure our cur-
rent experiences. The biographic self is in other words continuously related to 
the present self, and vice versa. It helps the present self to orient itself in the 
world. 
The third point concerns the notion of identity from the other pole of the 
spectrum of self-relatedness, that is, the side which relates to more reflective 
and developed forms of self-relatedness. As will be obvious by now, there exists 
an infinite number of ways of relating to oneself. Self-relatedness presupposes 
the embeddedness in an unfathomable number of relations to objects, events, 
and persons in the world. So, self-relatedness is not an egoistic or, even, subjec-
tivistic notion. It presupposes, from the outset, a world, the world of which one 
is part oneself; together with others with whom one shares one’s life. Now, we 
have to discern a new dimension of the concept of identity, that is, its orienta-
tion to otherness. Otherness is already present from the beginning, in the first 
attempts of the child to explore the world. To develop is to be oriented to what 
is new and what differs from oneself and from what one is already acquainted 
to. To learn is to appropriate this ‘otherness’. This appropriation is no ‘swal-
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lowing up’ of ‘the’ other, but a learning to discern distinctions, transitions, and 
boundaries and a way to relate to these distinctions, transitions, and bounda-
ries.  
 So, to summarize — what I am saying, is that identity implies embodiment as 
the result of the interplay between structural unfolding and existential orienta-
tion (first point); that the interplay between ‘structure’ and ‘direction’ can  
better be understood when the fundamental nature of the concept of self-
relatedness is acknowledged (second point); and that the recognition of ‘oth-
erness’ forms the heart of this notion of self-relatedness (third point). It is with 
this orientation of identity toward otherness that we are in better position to 
preserve a dimension of responsibility which goes beyond character and virtue. 
And this was the reason for our threefold interlude.  
 
4.2  Embodiment – Paul Ricoeur on oneself as another 
A brief intermezzo on the work of Paul Ricoeur may be helpful to phrase what 
has been said till now in a slightly different way. I will make use of Ricoeur’s 
Oneself as another, a rich text which is meant to demonstrate (a.o.) the moral 
nature of self-relatedness. I will highlight two issues: the need of a dimension of 
self-relatedness beyond character and virtue; ‘attestation’ is the term Ricoeur 
invents to indicate this dimension; and the interdependence of structural un-
folding and existential dynamic, an interdependence phrased by Ricoeur in 
terms of an interplay between idem-identity and ipseity. I begin with the sec-
ond issue.  
  When Ricoeur opens his discussion of personal identity in Oneself as another, 
he begins by drawing a fundamental distinction between idem-identity and ipse-
identity (Ricoeur 1990/1992). Classical accounts of personal identity, says  
Ricoeur, have failed to make this distinction by focusing almost exclusively on 
numerical and qualitative identity. Numerical identity, or singularity, refers to 
the bare fact that there is only one who is me (with the fingerprint as bodily 
expression of that fact). Qualitative identity refers to a particular quality or fea-
ture which is considered to ‘define’ or at least capture a fundamental aspect of 
personhood. Examples of such features are having a memory of oneself, char-
acter, and self-consciousness. Both numerical and qualitative identity, however, 
are one-sided in that they only refer to identity as ‘sameness’ in the course of 
time, that is, to idem-identity (being the same), thereby ignoring the other and 
even more fundamental aspect of personhood, namely selfhood, that one is 
someone, a self. Ricoeur offers an alternative view on personhood, by pointing 
to the self-referring nature of selfhood, for which he coins the term ipse (or ip-
seity; ipse-identity). Ipse-identity refers to oneself as a self-designating, reflexive 
structure, that is, a self that exists by relating to itself. The term reflexive refers 
in this context to self-relatedness, not to conscious self-reflection. The self-
referential nature of the I-self relationship may imply, of course, conscious self-
reflection. However, self-reflection is not a necessary condition for having a  
relation to oneself. 
44 gerrit glas 
 So, what is important about this distinction between idem and ipse identity? 
Ricoeur’s first answer is that a reduction of personhood to idem-identity would 
erase the difference between things and persons. We need ipse-identity to  
express who we are. At the level of idem-identity ‘who I am’ can not be  
distinguished from ‘what I am’. The human person, however, is not a thing in 
the world. He or she is not a thing that re-acts, but someone who acts and 
speaks and, by doing so, gives testimony of being a self-designating being. In 
short, we need a notion of ipseity to avoid materialism. So much will be clear by 
now. The second, and more important answer, is Ricoeur’s suggestion that 
both dimensions of identity are related in spite of their fundamental differ-
ence. For, the answer to the question who I am, helps to shape qualities of both 
singularity and sameness — singularity in that it is only me who can be respon-
sible for acts done by me; and sameness in that I remain myself by being faith-
ful to (for instance) my promises. The ipseity of the person brings us, 
therefore, via a transformed meaning of idem (sameness), into the sphere of 
faithfulness and personal responsibility.13 We may interpret this as Ricoeur’s 
manner of indicating the interdependence of structural unfolding and existen-
tial dynamic by self-relatedness. 
 The second issue. Ricoeur’s key word to indicate the moral nature of this 
self-related self is ‘attestation’. This is a difficult and somewhat ambiguous term 
in the sense that it refers to both ‘witnessing’ (‘being a witness’; ‘bearing wit-
ness of’) and to an elementary sense of ‘being called upon’. So much is clear 
that both meanings of attestation refer to otherness. The self, in its very self-
relational structure, cannot do without the otherness to which it is attuned. 
This openness towards otherness is expressed by my listening to and transmit-
ting of the stories of others. It is manifest in the assumption of an attitude of 
responsibility. What happens to others does say something to me and deprives 
me from an existence that is based on self-evident and self-sufficient certain-
ties. The self is ‘oneself as another’, that is, a self which searches for an open-
ness that is both based on and the expression of ‘otherness’ — the otherness of 
others whose fate I bear witness of and for whose lives I adopt responsibility by 
allowing them to hurt me and to awaken my sense for their well-being.14  
 
  
13   Ricoeur delineates how self-relatedness is implied in domains of speech, action, narra-
tion, and communal (institutional) interaction — in speech by the use of performatives (prom-
ises, assertions, declarations) which refer to the integrity (trustworthiness) of the speaker; in 
action by the fact that acts are not simply events in the world but presuppose agency and re-
sponsibility; in narration by the subtle dialectics between character and plot, a dialectic in 
which the narrating self aims at coherence of the I-self relationship over time; and, at the 
communal level, because larger communal wholes (institutions) maintain their moral identity 
only in the openness to otherness. 
14   I am very much aware of the fact that this notion of ‘otherness’ is highly unqualified and 
needs further delineation. I already suggested a link to Reformational philosophical distinc-
tions when I said that the child does not just ‘swallow up’ otherness, but learns to discern and 
to distinguish as one of the effects of the confrontation with otherness. Otherness may 
heighten one’s sense for qualitative (and potentially structural) distinctions, in other words.  
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4.3  Embodiment – Reformational philosophical anthropology and its con-
tribution to moral theory 
Ricoeur’s book is rich, I said, but I have to admit that it does not offer the 
reader much detail with respect to the interplay between the structural and the 
dynamic aspects of self-relatedness. Let us now turn to what Dooyeweerd and 
other Reformational philosophers have to say about the issue. At the beginning 
of this and in the previous section I pointed to the gap in Reformational phi-
losophy’s understanding of the embodiment of the ethical. Perhaps, I was per-
haps a bit too critical by speaking of the ‘only rudimentary account’ of 
Reformational philosophy. Let us summarize some of the insights of Dooye-
weerd and others and see what can be done further.  
 First we have to note the remarkable fact that for Dooyeweerd the human 
body or corporeality involves human existence in its entirety. I will not go 
deeply into this issue. Dooyeweerd’s reasons were obvious: mind-body dualism 
had to be rejected at any prize. We may welcome Dooyeweerd’s insight as a 
recognition of the embodied nature of all human functioning, mental func-
tioning included.  
 Secondly. The human body is called an enkaptic structural whole consisting 
of four hierarchically ordered substructures, the physical substructure being 
the ‘lowest’ and the (non-qualified and open) act-structure as the ‘highest’, 
with the biotic and psychical as intermediate substructures. The hierarchical 
ordering is significant: it brings to expression that no function of the act-
structure is freely floating; all functions of the act-structure are embedded in 
the functioning of the three ‘lower’ substructures. These substructures and 
their mutual relationships are, subsequently, analyzed along the familiar lines 
of his theory of structures of individuality, with its idea of opening-up of ‘lower’ 
structures by ‘higher structures’ and the notion of intermodal subject-object 
relationships.15 It is important to recognize at this juncture, that in the process 
of opening-up of these substructures and their subject-object relationships the 
self-relatedness of persons is not merely a formal, conceptual prerequisite, but 
receives its due by the gradual emergence of physical-biotic dispositions, habits, 
and character traits. In other words, self-relatedness is part of the course of a 
person’s development. This is a normative process. Self-relatedness seems to 
play a role in inventing this normativity, i.e., the process of discovering the in-
ternal ‘destiny’ of functions, capacities, and dispositions. We could perhaps 
even say that the subject is responsive to normativity because it is a self-relating 
subject. All normative responding is ‘self-relational’ responding.  
 I realize that by saying it this way we run the risk of mixing things up. The 
term responding is usually reserved to refer to the response of the subject-side 
of reality to the law or the law-side. So it is more precise to say that in the un-
folding of the substructures and their functions we are dealing with self-
relatedness in the sense of the duality of activity — receptivity, mentioned ear-
  
15   The subject in these subject-object relationships is not the ego or I, or the mind, or any 
Cartesian cogito. ‘Subject’ refers here to the ‘active’ side in the process of opening-up (activity 
in itself not implying any consciousness of it), like the biotic ‘object-side’ of a bird’s nest — as 
such a physical structure — is opened-up by the biotic subject function of the bird. 
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lier. This duality itself, in its turn, what I called ‘inventing’ or the process of dis-
covering normativity, can be said to be subjected to the law-subject scheme. In 
that sense all human development is normative development.  
 The flux and reflux of doing and experiencing, of activity and receptivity, 
forms the basis for the development of a sense of self that is basic for all further 
emotional and personality development. This sense of self serves as a point of 
reference against which future acts are weighed and current situations are 
judged with respect to their relevance and impact. This sense of self is the  
experiential ‘embodiment’, the receptive side, of who one basically is, like 
character traits and other dispositions are embodiments of the ‘active’ side. So, 
the difference between my account and Dooyeweerd’s does not regard the sig-
nificance attributed to the law — subject distinction, nor the recognition of 
self-relatedness as such. My account differs from Dooyeweerd’s in that I put 
more emphasis on the receptive side of human functioning as an indispensable 
element in the unfolding and stabilizing of the self-relatedness of human be-
ings in character, dispositions and habits. It was the notion of self-relatedness 
that made us aware of the importance of the interplay between action and ex-
perience, and, thus, of human receptivity.  
 Thirdly. With respect to ‘embodiment’ we find the notions of disposition 
and character already mentioned in Dooyeweerd’s 28th thesis of his ’32 theses 
about being human’ (Dooyeweerd 1942).16 Troost (1983) and others have 
elaborated on the issue of dispositions. Troost, moreover, distinguishes the 
‘ethos’ as a kind of foundational layer within the actstructure. The ethos is a 
fundamental motivating power in a person’s personality, a basic, continuously 
active and integrative layer directing and ordering all human desires and striv-
ings. The ethos is also shared with other people, usually a group of people with 
similar life- and wordviews. Terms like mentality and attitude do not reach 
deep enough, according to Troost. They ignore the religious and ethical moti-
vation of all human functioning. What I miss, here, is again the recognition of 
the receptive side of the ethos. Think for instance of the kind of moral sensitiv-
ity that expresses itself as compassion and of the notion of conscience. Com-
passion has been recognized by Reformational philosophers as an important 
dimension of the Christian ethos (Walsh et al. 1995). Little has been written 
about conscience. It is my impression that this has something to do with its 
negative connotations, that is, its association with feelings of guilt and shame 
and oppression by law-givers and authorities. However, I would like to suggest a 
much more positive account of conscience, an account which, for instance, in-
cludes gratitude for the very fact of one’s existence (like Aljosja expresses in 
The Brothers Karamazov) and a special kind of moral sensitivity, a sensitivity not 
only for suffering, but also a practical understanding of how to do the right 
  
16   There is a certain order here: character is a set of dispositions at the level of the act-
structure; temperament is the ensemble of dispositions that is anchored in the psychical sub-
structure; typical tendencies in motor behaviour and bodily expression are related to the biotic 
and physical substructure. It is interesting that the distinction between character and tem-
perament, after having become obsolete at the end of the fifties and after decades of absence 
in the scientific literature on personality and personality development, has re-emerged some 
15 years ago and has begun a second life.  
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things, and of how to relate to other people, even, of how to see how life is 
meant to be.  
 Discussions about the notions of ethos and disposition are important be-
cause they reflect more fine-grained attempts to grasp the coherence between 
religious directedness and the unfolding of (sub)structures. Troost has been 
one of the first in the movement of Reformational philosophy to acknowledge 
that ethics would become an inert and ineffective partner in the moral debate 
if it would restrict itself to be ‘science of the ethical aspect’. For this reason he 
developed his so-called praxeology, a science of human action, analyzing con-
cepts like the ethos, dispositions, and the principles of what he called ‘norma-
tive situational structures’. The concept of disposition is, just like the notion of 
ethos, attractive for such a broader conception of ethics, because dispositions 
are not bound by one particular modal aspect. Extraverts manifest their tem-
perament of extraversion in all areas of life: in the choices they make, in cop-
ing with stress, in their work, family life and sexuality. Their temperament 
reveals on the one hand who they are (identity; core sense of self) and is, on 
the other hand, fully interwoven with all aspects of act life and the functioning 
of the substructures (even the biotic and physical ones as recent findings on 
the neurochemistry of pleasure suggest). In short, dispositions form the flexi-
ble conceptual matrix connecting ‘structure’ and ‘direction’. I think the em-
phasis on dispositions as organizing and integrating factors in human activity is 
important and justifiable. However, it should be supplemented with an account 
on moral receptivity (or: sensitivity), both in a dispositional sense and as part of 
the notion of ethos.  
The notion of self-relatedness may be helpful here too to solve an old, some-
what technical issue in Dooyeweerd’s systematic philosophy, which also affects 
Troost’s conception of dispositions. The issue being whether or not ‘modali-
ties’ ‘reach’, or rather take part in, the supra-temporal heart and, therefore, 
could or could not be said to exist ‘in’ the heart. In the latter case the modali-
ties ‘stop’ at the border between the temporal and the supra-temporal world. 
Dooyeweerd’s ‘prism’ metaphor strongly suggests that modalities find their 
source in the supra-temporal (unbroken) sphere, the heart, like the light be-
fore it is ‘broken’ into the spectre of colours. Epistemologically there arises a 
problem, however. How could one know of such ‘non-fused’ (white, supra-
temporal) light, when modal distinctions, like colours, loose their distinctness 
in the concentric direction? And, what are the ontological consequences of this 
epistemological uncertainty? Troost is inclined to locate dispositions and the 
ethos in a conceptual space ‘closer’ to the heart than the sphere of modal 
diversity. He then stumbles on the same epistemic problem and suggests an un-
derstanding of dispositions in an ‘idea-like’ fashion, that is, in a quasi-
transcendental sense.  
I fear that spatial metaphors reach their limits here and are in fact over-
stretched with respect to their meaning. Much of the problem dissipates when 
the directional component is conceptualized in terms of a multiform dynamics 
of self-relatedness with more and less stable elements — dispositions being  
instantiations of a more stable type of self-relatedness, and experiences and 
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short-lasting actions as fleeting and unstable instantiations. I emphasize that 
the concept of self-relatedness is not meant to deny the importance of Dooye-
weerd’s notion of the heart, or even his notion of concentration. Nor do I sug-
gest that self-relatedness can solve the enigma of personal identity, for instance 
by providing a definition or a set of criteria. The task of the concept of self-
relatedness in this context is twofold: to highlight the fundamental nature and 
incredible plurality of forms of being self-related; and to help avoid any sugges-
tion of a metaphysical interpretation of Dooyeweerd’s notion of supra-
temporality.  
The notion of self-relatedness, furthermore, has the conceptual potential to 
preserve the fundamental meaning of the biblical notion of the heart. First and 
foremost this biblical notion refers to the fact that human existence at its most 
fundamental level is determined by and responding to Divine calling and sus-
taining action. Before we were there, we were already ‘seen’ and meant to exist 
by the Other. Even our deepest longings are preceded and transgressed by  
Divine longing, which is a longing for man (Heschel 1954; 1955; 1962). Con-
ceptually nor existentially Divine presence can be encompassed or ‘grasped’. It 
is this superabundance (or: transcendence) that defines human self-
relatedness. Responding to the Divine call is the very essence of our existence. 
Living is to relate to this ‘essence’. Instead of referring to a state of self-
absorption, the notion of self-relatedness, therefore, refers to the most funda-
mental conviction that otherness is constitutive for self-relatedness.  
 I admit that new questions will emerge with such an account: how different 
has the otherness of the Other, and of others, to be? Can otherness be appro-
priated? Does such a heavy accent on otherness not lead to a negative theol-
ogy? Is it compatible with the idea of a speaking God? Is it compatible with a 
Divine command ethics? I have no satisfactory answer to all these questions, 
and it is not the place here to go into these issues in detail. But let me at least 
share my impression that these questions may not be insurmountable pro-
vided, at the least, the notion of otherness be not taken in an absolute sense 
(as the totally unknowable other or absolutely different otherness), but rather 
as referring to difference, distinction, and transition. With respect to ‘Divine 
commands’: how could they be taken as ‘natural’, ‘familiar’, or ‘of my flesh and 
blood’ (that is: as identical with or similar to my nature)? With respect to one-
self: we often distance ourselves from our most spontaneous acts (in which oth-
erness seems swept away), we say ‘I lost myself’ or ‘I acted on impulse’. With 
respect to otherness in the interpersonal sphere: even in our most intimate in-
terpersonal moments ‘otherness’ is never away; on the contrary, otherness 
heightens the intensity and meaning of these moments, both physically, affec-
tively and spiritually.17 Otherness is most difficult to delineate when applied to 
knowledge of God. My hunch is to seek for a way in the same direction as just 
sketched, that is, a way that does not take otherness in an absolute sense, but as 
  
17   Think for instance of the difference between being touched and touching oneself; the 
‘otherness’ that is present in being touched is what fulfils; touching oneself may give a sense of 
safety or be self-assuring or exciting, but always via conscious or non-conscious memories or 
the use of imagination; memories and imaginations in other words that imply the existence of 
others, real or imagined.  
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recognition of the fact that God radically differs from me — to the extent that 
even my dearest thought or experience of Him may be inaccurate or false — 
together with the faithful acknowledgement that nevertheless He addresses me 
in a rich plurality of ways and knows how to reach me in spite of my imperfec-
tion. 
 
In sum, my suggestions for improvement of the Reformational philosophical 
view on man and on ethics follow from my emphasis on self-relatedness and its 
diversity. They are threefold:  
– to give more relative weight to receptivity in balancing activity and recep-
tivity, as well as on the playfulness that comes with it;  
– to acknowledge the importance of a core sense of self as the receptive 
side of a self that is co-constituted by dispositions and character on the 
‘active’ side;  
– to more fully appreciate the role of conscience, empathy, and compassion 
in the exertion of moral sensitivity.  
 
4.4  Embodiment – virtue ethics 
We are now ready for an appreciation of the contribution of virtue ethics, re-
cently revived from a condition of being almost near-death and now, again, an 
important current in ethical theory and especially in medical and nursing eth-
ics. I will — again — abstain from a scholarly overview and immediately dig 
into the systematic issues.18 Virtue ethics and Reformational philosophy have a 
natural inclination towards each other for obvious reasons: they are both inter-
ested in normativity as a dimension that is inherent to the practices in which 
human beings are involved.19 What they share is recognition of the intrinsic 
normativity of human existence and a set of ideas about how this normativity 
could be expressed in virtuous action (virtue ethics) and the normative unfold-
ing of the structural side of reality (Reformational philosophy), respectively. 
So, intrinsic normativity and substantiveness are at the heart of both ap-
proaches to ethics.  
I must say that I consider the work of Taylor and McIntyre as enormously 
important for the unmasking of naturalist ethics (which views the good as a 
freely chosen ‘option’) and the emptiness of emotivism (which views the good 
as ‘what feels good’). Especially Taylor’s Sources of the Self is admirable for the 
kind of receptive intuition that helps him to get a feel for the different layers 
within the Geist, the moral spirit, of our age. His work is a beautiful illustration 
  
18   The revival of virtue ethics has different backgrounds: concerns on moral pluralism, ni-
hilism and naturalist ethics in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Charles Taylor 
(1989), respectively; interest in male/female distinctions in moral development in the Gilligan-
Kohlberg debate (Gilligan 1982); ensuing re-appreciation of the notion of care in both hu-
manist and catholic contributions to medical and nursing ethics. 
19   At the occasion of the presentation of Henk Jochemsen and my book on the foundations 
of medical ethics, the Catholic bishop W. Eyk welcomed our contribution as the final recogni-
tion of the familiarity between the Catholic appropriation of Aristotelian ethics and the Ref-
ormation view on creation.  
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of the exertion of moral receptivity we spoke about earlier, combined with 
deep historical insight and philosophical structural analysis. Here we have an 
example of a philosopher, who shows his solidarity with the culture he criti-
cizes and who uses his self-relatedness as a receptive instrument informing and  
shaping his critical analysis. Consider for instance Taylor’s hesitance with re-
spect to the dilemma at the end of his book, viz. the dilemma between what he 
calls ‘spiritual lobotomy’ and ‘self-mutilation’. Spiritual lobotomy would mean to 
abstain from any philosophical judgment on spiritual sources and their possi-
ble contribution to the moral problems of our age. Self-mutilation, on the other 
hand, refers to the unintended consequences of what occurs when we do allow 
spiritual sources to inspire us to high ideals (the ideal of benevolence, for in-
stance). Taylor says: “... the demands of benevolence can exact a high cost in 
self-love and self-fulfilment, which may in the end require payment in self-
destruction or even in violence”.20 Perhaps a little bit prudence is appropriate 
here, he suggests. Elsewhere he warns for the dangers of moral superiority, the 
kind of superiority for which Nietzsche was so allergic, because he recognized 
it in a certain servile mentality among Christians as well as in an inclination to 
self-sacrifice. I think, these are nice and important points. Any ethics of suffer-
ing is vulnerable to the kind of moral superiority, Taylor has in mind — the 
superiority of the victim, who is always right, and the superiority of the one who 
takes side of the victim, and thereby shares in the victim’s moral righteousness. 
Of course, I am not implying that an ethics of suffering would by definition or 
factually imply a position of moral superiority. On the contrary! Yet, compas-
sion and suffering are not the sole issues for Christian ethics.  
 At this juncture I would like to comment briefly on virtue ethics.  
First. Virtue ethics, with its emphasis on what is internal and therefore 
‘naturally given’ in a certain normative practice may have difficulties in point-
ing out the normative moments of highly technological practices. Reforma-
tional philosophy is familiar with a similar problem, viz. how to discern crea-
tional normativity, especially in contexts in which everything is man-made and 
artificial.21 For example: to what extent has medical and nursing ethics to ar-
gue for a ‘thick’ notion of care in highly technical settings with a far developed 
division of labour? Reformational philosophy, with its sharp nose for distinct 
responsibilities and its rich conceptuality language for articulating these dis-
tinctions, is — at least in theory — ahead of virtue ethics to give a full account 
of the normativity of highly developed, technical practices. In addition, for 
both virtue ethicists and Reformational philosophers, I would like to recom-
mend a greater appreciation for the elements of play, invention, and trial and 
error. We often simply do not know how a certain division of labour and use of 
techniques will turn out to influence a certain practice. These new practices 
have to be tested and sensitively evaluated by all parties that are involved.  
  
20   Taylor (1989), 528. The dilemma itself is described at page 530.  
21   Al Wolters, in a more general sense, refers to the same difficulty at the end of his paper 
at the occasion of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of ICS in Toronto (1995); cf. Wolters 
(1995), 45. 
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Practices, therefore, have the same circular and self-related structure as the 
people working in them and as human beings in general.  
Secondly. Virtue ethics lacks the notion of a religious depth dimension as 
well as a vocabulary for evil, sin, and wrongness. Virtuous action can be per-
formed with only a superficial commitment to the spirit by which these virtues 
are supposed to be animated. Virtue ethics is attractive for medical ethicists 
and practitioners because its language can rather easily be translated into the 
now common language of ‘competencies’. However, it lacks a vocabulary for 
issues such as inspiration and commitment, benevolence and malevolence.  
 To conclude: virtue ethics is an important ally in the current moral debate 
for its recognition of the intrinsicness of the normative dimension of human 
existence and its substantive notion of how this normative dimension could be 
acknowledged in different practices. However, it falls short in the analysis of 
highly technological and/or specialized practices and in its relative neglect of 
the volitional and spiritual aspects of human existence, in particular acts of ma-
levolence and the notion of evil.  
 
 
5.  Evil – transcending philosophical anthropology; instigation to go beyond ethics 
With these latter remarks we are already touching our last subject, the endur-
ing reality of evil and its impact on the way we as philosophers think about 
moral theory. We called this subject — with some further qualifications — a 
white spot in Reformational philosophical thinking and argued for a more sub-
stantive account.  
The notion of evil takes us to a region of thought that transcends the scope 
of philosophical anthropology and — if we may believe Paul Ricoeur (1955)22 
—, also of moral theory proper. It leads to questions that are usually dealt with 
in cosmology, theology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. Evil is both 
older and larger than man, I said earlier, and this is reflected in the broad 
range of disciplines from the perspective of which it can be studied. I will, nev-
ertheless, say a few words about evil because it seems such an important subject 
in the understanding of who we are and what we have to do.  
There is another reason to deviate from the path of a strictly anthropologi-
cal approach at this point of our discussion. This is that to a considerable de-
gree contemporary moral confusion seems to be related to tensions that have 
arisen between the macro- and the micro-sphere of human interaction. I men-
tioned already the tension between justice, conceived as just distribution of 
goods among the population, and beneficence as prevailing value in the indi-
vidual doctor (nurse) — patient relationship. I will discuss this example in 
more detail further on. 
But, first, I will make a few remarks about evil. In the section on ‘Ethics and 
Reformational philosophy’ I pointed out how according to Reformational phi-
losophy the reality of evil shows up: in an unjustified absolutization of an as-
pect, or thing, under the law; in an attendant internal antagonism of the 
  
22   See also Van der Hoeven (1980a), (1980b). 
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apostate ground motives; as well as in disproportional developments and anti-
normative states of affairs. I suggested that this type of structural analysis 
should be complemented with a more phenomenological, psychologically and 
theologically informed approach that is sensitive to evil’s non-transparency.23 I 
refer here to what has been said about improvement of the receptive skills of 
Reformational moral philosophy. This type of empathic description and re-
spectful analysis may make us aware of unnoticed aspects of the phenomenon 
under study.  
Let me, for the sake of clarity, give an example from my own work, based 
on a philosophical interest that first awakened at the occasion of the 50th anni-
versary of liberation day in Holland in 1995 and was enhanced by the Sre-
brenica drama that took place in the summer of the same year. I saw for the 
first time the entire documentary Shoah of Claude Lanzmann (1985) and 
watched several television documentaries on the events in former Yugoslavia, 
among which an impressive BBC documentary. During those days I also read 
Hannah Arendt’s Eichman in Jerusalem (1965) and Robert Lifton’s The Nazi Doc-
tors (1986). I provide this biographical information to give you an impression 
of the type of experiences and events that helped shape my attempt to clarifi-
cation. (Later followed other experiences, clinical experiences as well.) 
First of all, what struck me was the non-transparency and impenetrable na-
ture of acts of evil. In the presence of these acts people watching them did not 
only keep their mouth about the badness of what was going on. Even more im-
portant was the strong suggestion that such ‘moral’ talk was futile and totally 
irrelevant; the reality of evil seemed to exert an influence that made it un-
thinkable and literally unreal to speak about what ‘really’ was going on. I am 
talking about life reports on the hunt and the execution of Muslim men.  
Later, I found out how little there has been written on sadism and other 
forms of excessive malevolence. Some authors were clear about their dilemma: 
trying to explain excessive malevolence seemed to reduce malevolent acts to 
the order of what can be understood; however, were these acts, or at least some 
of them, not beyond any comprehension?24 And would any explanation sooner 
or later not be interpreted as an excuse. For, understanding is pardoning. 
Bruno Bettelheim, famous Jewish psychoanalyst and writer of several books, 
among which an important book on fairy tales, severely criticized psychiatrist 
and journalist Robert Lifton for attempting to comprehend what the Nazi doc-
tors did. By doing so, Lifton could not but reduce the moral responsibility of 
the Nazi doctors — which, according to Bettelheim — should be avoided at 
any cost.  
What struck me in the second place, was the splitting in the mind of many 
perpetrators. Lifton gives a post-hoc analysis of several of the characters of the 
Nazi doctors and concludes that their mental functioning could only escape 
from breakdown by the strong activity of splitting as an inner, psychic mecha-
  
23   Transparency is one of Kierkegaard’s favorite terms to indicate that a person’s freedom is 
appropriately proportioned to that person’s relationship to God. Persons may increase or loose 
transparency (cf. Kierkegaard 1848). For my own account of this non-transparency (I use the 
term speechlessness), see Glas (in press).  
24   This issue is explored by Goldberg (1996), Chapter 1.  
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nism of defence. Mengele stroke the children over their hair and gave them 
candy, and yet was able to watch their death in the gas chamber 15 minutes 
later, seemingly untouched.  
What finally became clear was the fundamental importance of the emotion 
of shame in the development and maintenance of splitting. The unlimited de-
sire for power and domination of the perpetrators appeared to have roots in 
deep feelings of inferiority and shame, and, therefore, unexpressed anger and 
hatred.25  
What is the point of this phenomenological and psychological reconstruc-
tion when it comes to moral philosophy? Most important, I think, is the in-
creased awareness of the power of evil, as a real dynamic that is almost impene-
trable both cognitively and affectively. We can simply not understand plain evil, 
nor can most of us empathize with it. The power of evil is sometimes larger 
than us. With respect to moral philosophy we could add that a heightened 
awareness of some of the features of evil (that it resists to be verbally addressed 
and that it is mentally blocked off) may perhaps also be recognized in our phi-
losophical discussions, for instance when certain topics are blocked off or not 
spoken about in spite of their obvious importance. Experiencing the enormous 
diversity of forms of self-relatedness may, therefore, be helpful to get a sense 
for the unsaid and to address it, and, by doing so, to overcome denial and 
mental suppression, also in our philosophical work. So, philosophical work 
may be exciting and even healing, precisely when we have our most difficult 
moments, when the issues become dark and the realities we study are frag-
mented and we seem to have lost our capacity to see them in the right perspec-
tive. These are the moments that the unsaid can be addressed and splitting and 
shame, if present, overcome.  
Other issues might be brought up in this context. Has moral philosophy a 
message for a culture that seems to be in the grip of anxiety and feelings of un-
safety? How do we and should we evaluate this ‘anxiety’? What is its nerve? Is 
there a religious dynamic present in this anxiety?  
I leave these questions for this moment in order to say, finally, a few words 
about the issues that emerge in the clash between macro- and micro-worlds, 
especially the tension between justice and beneficence. Here we see Reforma-
tional philosophy at its best, I think. I would like to illustrate this by contrasting 
reformational philosophical insights with Avishai Margalit ‘ethics of memory’. 
Margalit (2002) draws a distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ relations, thick 
relations being the ones we entertain with ‘whom we care about’ (family, 
friends) and thin relations being the ones we have with the rest of humanity. 
He makes a corresponding distinction between ethics and morality — a distinc-
tion in which ethics is focused on thick relations and morality on thin relations. 
The ethics of memory, as one could guess on the basis of this, is concerned 
  
25   Interestingly enough it appears that the structural features of reconciliation show a re-
versed version of the structural features of evil. Resolving the evil I do toward the other re-
quires that I am able to say what I have done wrong (the reverse of silence and the 
unspeakable), that I recognize my guilt (which is incompatible with splitting) and that I ask for 
forgiveness (which is very shameful, but may resolve shame when penitence is accepted and 
forgiveness is given); see Glas (in press); Murphy and Hampton (1988); Volf (1996).  
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with thick relations. They are the kind of relations of which it is important to 
keep memories alive. Thin relations are guided by communal self-interest, that 
is, by a theory of social contract and the concept of justice that ensues from this 
theory. By drawing such a sharp line between the two types of relationships and  
their corresponding types of moral reflection, Margalit seems to propose a di-
vision in ethical theory too: a communitarian approach for theories of thick 
relations and a utilitarian approach for the theory of thin relations.  
Margalit’s account is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it contains 
much interesting material for the dialogue between Christians, Jews, and hu-
manists, because of the mix of receptivity for underlying meaning, frequent 
references to biblical stories and parables, and unshakable determination with 
respect to the main thesis.  
Secondly, Margalit does have a point with his objection to some humanist 
and Christian approaches which presume that all ethics is about thick rela-
tions. Such accounts of ethics are questionable because they easily lead to exal-
tation and sometimes even a false sense of authenticity. Ordinary people, like 
we almost all are, hardly tolerate to care for a severely ill or dying person for 
more than a couple of days. It is not only compassion we feel for these people, 
but also disgust and boredom. And: we simply can not entertain thick relations 
with every human being in the world. We are finite beings and limited in our 
capacities for such moral heroism. Margalit’s accounts reminds us of a saying 
of Ricoeur that in the sphere of institutions the ‘I — thou’ disappears and is 
replaced by relations between me and ‘third persons’ (he/she/they).  
Finally, Margalit’s duality certainly goes too far. However, this exaggeration 
of the difference between relational types gives us the opportunity to bring in 
the much more refined type of analysis that Reformational philosophy could 
give of interpersonal and institutional relations and their intrinsic normativity. 
Here we see the strengths of a sound analysis of the normative structure of 
such relationships. The doctor — patient relationship, for instance, is thick, 
nor thin. It is not a relationship that is aiming at the preservation of a shared 
memory or the cultivation of the uniqueness of that relationship. Nor is the 
nature of this relationship compatible with a purely utilitarian (contractarian) 
approach, an approach in which doctor and patient are strangers. The same 
holds for the relation between nurse and patient. One of the most crucial pro-
fessional competencies of doctors and nurses is that they pay equal attention to 
patients, irrespective of whether these patients are talkative, rich, attractive, or 
interesting in another sense. This equality in the distribution of attention 
might be conceived as (analogically) referring to the equality that is inherent 
to the concept of distributive justice. This would imply that justice and care do 
not necessarily exclude one another and may even need one another. The ex-
ample of the doctor/nurse — patient relationship can help to recognize that 
there exists not a watertight barrier between communitarian and utilitarian 
approaches, or between thick and thin, or care and justice. Such schemes are 
much too simple to capture the reality of modern medicine — and of or our 
culture. All that has been said above points in the direction of a plurality of  
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relations or relational types, with each their own normativity, and — even — 
kind of theory to support it.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion  
Is Reformational ethics bound to the perspective of the law and of a sovereign 
lawgiver maintaining an unchangeable creational order? I do not think so. 
Such a perspective would be one-sided and may even cause harm. My approach 
concurs with the development of a Trinitarian perspective by Richard Mouw 
(1990), and others (cf. several contributions in Clark and Rakestraw 1994).  
First, the law is the law of a loving Father, who liberates from the slavery and 
exile of sin as expressed in the preamble of the Ten Commandments.  
Our Reformational ethics, is secondly, sensitive for the dynamics of evil, sin, 
and reconciliation. It is tries to develop a giving and healing vocabulary, a vo-
cabulary that is both subtle enough to express involvement with the problems 
of the world and strong enough to preserve its own identity. This identity is not 
a possession, but a gift, based on the faithful embrace of God’s promises in Je-
sus Christ. Such philosophy avoids speaking from a position of moral superior-
ity, while maintaining its Christian ardour and perseverance.  
Third, this philosophy will also be playful and inventive and creative and, 
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